Dominant firms and the monopoly problem: Conclusion

Although expanding section 2 enforcement to include dominance ac- quired by discontinued acumen, chance event, and default failure poses numerous difficulties,48 the approach proposed has the advantage over existing policy of addressing the issue of single-firm dominance in a direct and candid manner. Assigning residual responsibility to the government to intervene in a dominant

Oligopoly: Some Antecedents

1. Economic Antecedents 1.1. FELLNER ON QUALIFIED JOINT-PROFIT MAXIMIZATION Fellner contends that it is impossible to deduce determinate prices and outputs for oligopoly markets on the basis of demand and supply functions that are derived from technological data and utility functions ( 1949, pp. 9-11). Rather, fewness carries with it a range of indeterminacy.

Oligopoly Regarded as a Problem of Contracting

In order to focus attention on what I believe to be the critical issues. I will assume, initially, that oligopolistic agreements are lawful, so that there is no legal bar to collusion, but that oligopolists cannot appeal to the courts for assistance in enforcing the terms of an oligopolistic agreement. The oligopolists can, however,

Oligopoly: The Contracting Approach and Prior Treatments Contrasted

Like Fellner, the problem of oligopoly under the contracting approach is treated as one of interdependence recognized. Also, as Fellner does, the multidimensional nature of the interdependence issue is emphasized: price coordination is only a part of the problem, especially in differentiated product industries. But whereas Fellner attributes the problems of interdependence to the

Policy Implications: Dominant Firms versus Oligopolistic Interdependence

The monopolist (or dominant firm) enjoys an advantage over oligopolists in adaptational respects since he does not have to write a contract in which future contingencies are identified and appropriate adaptation thereto are devised. Rather, he can face the contingencies when they arise: each bridge can be crossed when it is reached, rather than

Toward a Transactional Paradigm

It is elementary that analysis influences the way the world is perceived, including the power to delude and misguide as well as to illuminate and instruct (Nelson, 1974, p. 3). It is also widely agreed that if mechanism B, not mechanism A, is thought to be generating the phenomena of interest, the intellectually respectable

The Organizational Failures Framework and Hierarchy

The organizational failures framework applies to the study of a variety of exchange relations that are not prima facie associated and applies symmet- rically to market and nonmarket forms of organization alike. It attempts to identify ultimate, as contrasted with immediate, sources of transactional friction. As compared with previous efforts to explain market and

Antitrust Implications

The policy implications of the argument that are of principal concern are those having to do with antitrust. Dewey has described the role of economists in antitrust as follows (1959, p. i) : The important issues in the control of monopoly are ‘’economic’’ in the sense that judges and administrators are compelled to make

Some Directions for Future Research

1. Theoretical A leading theoretical need is for additional work on the properties of hierarchy. The mathematical theory of hierarchical forms is not, unfortu-nately, well-developed (Varaiya, 1972, p. 497). Simon’s (1962) interdisciplinary review of the evolution of hierarchy and his heuristic discussion of its advantages provides useful background for such an effort. The economic

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Antecedents from the 1930s

1. Economics  A significant contribution to the study of economic organization that preceded the 1930s was Frank Knight’s (1965) classic treatment of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit in 1922. Knight plainly anticipated Percy Bridgeman’s counsel to social, scientists that “the principal problem in understanding the actions of men is to understand how they think—how their

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: The Next Thirty Years

Those were auspicious beginnings. A sound basis for further advances had plainly been laid. The comparative institutional analysis of economic organi- zation did not, however, flourish. Attention was concentrated elsewhere. The prevailing orientation toward economic organization in the thirty- year hiatus between 1940 and 1970 was that technological features of firm and market organization

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: An Overview

The book successively sets out the rudiments of transaction cost economics, applies the basic arguments to a series of economic institutions over which there has been widespread disagreement or puzzlement, and develops public policy ramifications. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the transaction cost economics ap- proach to the study of economic organization. The

Transaction Costs

1. Frictionlessness  Kenneth Arrow has defined transaction costs as the “costs of running the economic system” (1969, p. 48). Such costs are to be distinguished from production costs, which is the cost category with which neoclassical analysis has been preoccupied. Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. The manifold successes

Transaction Cost Economics: A Cognitive Map of Contract

The field of specialization with which transaction cost economics is most closely associated is industrial organization. A number of the leading ap- proaches to the study of industrial organization and the relation that transaction cost economics bears to.them are examined here. Industrial organization examines contract in terms of the purposes served. What are the

Transaction Cost Economics: The World of Contract

The world of contract is variously described as one of (1) planning, (2) promise, (3) competition, and (4) governance (or private ordering). Which of these descriptions is most applicable depends on the behavioral assumptions that pertain to an exchange and on the economic attributes of the good or service in question. As developed more

Transaction Cost Economics: A Simple Contracting Schema

Assume that a good or service can be supplied by either of two alternative technologies. One is a general purpose technology, the other a special purpose technology. The special purpose technology requires greater investment in transaction-specific durable assets and is more efficient for servicing steady- state demands. Using k as a measure of transaction-specific

Economic Organization of the Company Tow

The company town is mainly regarded as a painful reminder of labor abuses associated with an earlier era. Surely there is nothing favorable, much less redeeming, that can be said about such a condition. Still, company towns were the exception rather than the rule The question, moreover, needs to be asked, why would anyone

Transaction Cost Economics: Applications

The applications of transaction cost economics sketched here are developed more extensively in later chapters. The object is merely to motivate the proposition that transaction cost economics makes useful contact with many of the issues of central interest to applied microeconomics. 1. Vertical Market Restrictions  Whereas it was once common to approach customer and

Transaction Cost Economics: Concluding Remarks

Transaction cost economics relies on and develops the following propositions:  The transaction is the basic unit of analysis. Any problem that can be posed directly or indirectly as a contracting problem is usefully investigated in transaction cost economizing terms. Transaction cost economies are realized by assigning transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance

Contractual Man: Behavioral Assumptions

Many economists treat behavioral assumptions’ as a matter of convenience. This reflects a widely held opinion that the realism of the assumptions is unimportant and that the fruitfulness of a theory turns on its implications (Friedman, 1953).2 As noted earlier, however, Bridgeman urges that an understanding of the actions of men requires more self-conscious