Incentives of agency theory – Incentives in Planned Economies

We must distinguish between the Soviet practice and the theory of planning devel- oped in the Western countries. As explained by Berliner (1976), In the early years of the Soviet period there was some hope that socialist society could count on the spirit of public service as a sufficient motiva- tion for economic activity.

Incentives of agency theory – Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design

When general equilibrium theorists attempted to extend the resource allocation mechanisms to nonconvex environments they realized that new issues of commu- nication and incentives arose: In a broader perspective, these findings suggest the possibility of a more systematic study of resource allocation mechanisms. In such a study, unlike in the more traditional approach, the

Introduction to The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

Incentive problems arise when a principal wants to delegate a task to an agent. Delegation can be motivated either by the possibility of benefitting from some increasing returns associated with the division of tasks, which is at the root of eco- nomic progress, or by the principal’s lack of time or lack of any

The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off: The Basic Model

1. Technology, Preferences, and Information  Consider a consumer or a firm (the principal) who wants to delegate to an agent the production of q units of a good. The value for the principal of these q units is S(q) where S’ > 0, S” < 0 and S(0) = 0. The marginal value of the

The Complete Information Optimal Contract

1. First-Best Production Levels  First suppose that there is no asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. The efficient production levels are obtained by equating the principal’s marginal value and the agent’s marginal cost. Hence, first-best outputs are given by the following first-order conditions and The  complete  information  efficient  production  levels  q∗

Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts

1. Incentive Compatibility and Participation  Suppose now that the marginal cost θ is the agent’s private information and let us consider the case where the principal offers the menu of contracts  hoping  that  an  agent  with  type  θ  will  select  (t∗, q∗)  and  an agent  with  type  θ¯ will  select  instead . From Figure

Information Rents

To understand the structure of the optimal contract it is useful to introduce the concept of information rent. We saw in section 2.2 that, under complete information, the principal (who has all the bargaining power by assumption) is able to maintain all types of agents at  their  zero  status  quo  utility  level.  Their  respective

The Optimization Program of the Principal

According to our timing of the contractual game, the principal must offer a menu of contracts before knowing which type of agent he is facing. Therefore, he will compute  the  benefit  of  any  menu  of  contracts in  expected  terms. The principal’s problem writes as Using the definition of the information rents U  = t

The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

1. The Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric Information  The major technical difficulty of problem jP k, and more generally of incentive theory, is to determine which of the many constraints imposed by incentive com- patibility and participation are the relevant ones, i.e., the binding ones at the optimum of the principal’s problem. A first approach

The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information

When the delegation of task occurs within the firm, a major conclusion of the above analysis is that, because of asymmetric information, the firm does not max- imize the social value of trade, or more precisely its profit—a maintained assump- tion of most economic theory. This lack of allocative efficiency should not be considered

Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing

Let us view the principal as acting for a set of consumers and the agent as a firm producing a consumption good. The first-best rules defined by (2.4) and (2.5) can be interpreted as price equal to marginal cost since consumers on the market will equate their marginal utility of consumption to price. Under

The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off: The Revelation Principle

In the above analysis, we have restricted the principal to offer a menu of con- tracts, one for each possible type. First, one may wonder if a better outcome could be achieved with a more complex contract allowing the agent possibly to choose among more options. Second, one may also wonder whether some sort

A More General Utility Function for the Agent

Still keeping quasi-linear utility functions, let  U  = t − C(q,θ ) now be the agent’s objective  function  with  the  assumptions:  Cq   > 0,  Cθ  > 0,  Cqq  > 0  and  Cqqθ > 0. The  generalization  of  the  Spence-Mirrlees  property  used  so  far  is  now  Cqθ  > 0. This latter condition still ensures that the different types of

Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints

As we have already mentioned, in most of our discussion dealing with the case of adverse selection, we consider the case of contracts offered at the interim stage, i.e., once the agent already knows his type. However, sometimes the principal and the agent can contract at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the agent

Commitment

To solve our incentive problem, we have implicitly assumed that the principal has a strong ability to commit himself not only to a distribution of rents that will induce information revelation but also to some allocative inefficiency designed to reduce the cost of this revelation. Alternatively, this assumption also means that the court of

Stochastic Mechanisms

We consider here the framework of section 2.10 with a general cost function C(q, θ).  Let  us  rewrite  the  principal’s  problem  as When  S(·) is  concave  and  C(·) is  convex,  the  principal’s  objective  function is  concave  in .  Neglecting  constraints  (2.78)  and  (2.79)  as  usual,  the remaining constraints (2.77) and (2.80) define a convex

Informative Signals to Improve Contracting

In this section, we investigate the impacts of various improvements of the prin- cipal’s information system on the optimal contract. The idea here is to see how signals that are exogenous to the relationship can be used by the principal to bet- ter design the contract with the agent. The simple observation of performances

Contract Theory at Work

This section proposes several classical settings where the basic model of this chap- ter is useful. Introducing adverse selection in each of these contexts has proved to be a significative improvement of standard microeconomic analysis. 1. Regulation  In the Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model, the principal is a regulator who maximizes a weighted

Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection

The main theme of chapter 2 was to determine how the fundamental conflict between rent extraction and efficiency could be solved in a principal-agent rela- tionship with adverse selection. In the models presented in chapter 2, this conflict was relatively easy to understand because it resulted from the simple interaction of a single incentive

Adverse Selection: More than Two Types

Suppose  that  h may  take  three  possible  values,  i.e., ,  with  θ¯ − θˆ = θˆ − θ = Δθ for simplicity, and with respective probabilities v, vˆ, and v¯ such that v + vˆ + v¯ = 1. We denote a truthful direct revelation mechanism in this three-type environment  by .  Using  similar