A Model of Environmental Effects

There are a variety of possible mechanisms by which the organization’s context can come to influence its structure and actions. While the environment (or, more correctly, actions of others in the environment) may present the contingencies that create problems for the organization, those actions must be enacted and considered by organizational members. In Chapter

Organizational Context and Intraorganizational Power

The first link in the model of environmental effects on organizations is the effect of the environment on the distribution of power and control within the organization. Such an effect is posited in sociological analyses of organizations, most recently in the development of the strategic contingencies theory of intraorganizational power by Hickson and his colleagues

Executive Succession and Organizational Power

The second step in the model of organizational change specifies that one outcome of the distribution of power within the organization is the, selection and tenure of individuals in major administrative positions. Since power conveys the ability to influence organizational decisions (e.g., Pfeifer and Salancik, 1974), it is likely that power will be used

Executive Discretion and Organizational Decision Making

The final link in the model of environment-organizational effects suggested that the administrator can affect decisions that direct the structure and activities of the organization. Presumably, such direction is to make the organization more consistent with the requirements of its environment. Thus, hospital administrators bring ideas for change, establishing elaborate inventory and cost accounting systems

Executive Recruitment and Interfirm Coordination

Thus far in this chapter we have described executive succession as a mechanism for organizational change, affected by the distribution of power within the organization and the organization s context and, in turn, affecting organizational designs and decisions. Another role served by executive succession is the integration of the organization with its environment and

A Resource Dependence Perspective

To survive, organizations require resources. Typically, acquiring resources means the organization must interact with others who control those resources. In that sense, organizations depend on their environments. Because the organization does not control the resources it needs, resource acquisition may be problematic and uncertain. Others who control resources may be undependable, particularly when resources

The Design and Management of Externally Controlled Organizations: Three Managerial Roles

In the first chapter, we indicated what a model of administration might look like using the theoretical perspective developed in this book. We return to the three roles introduced then to see what we have learned about the importance and use of those roles. The three roles of management—symbolic, responsive, and discretionary—differ in the way

Designing Externally Controlled Organizations

This is not a treatise on organizational design. However, some implications of the resource dependence perspective for design are worthy of consideration, if only because the adequacy and value of the perspective can be assessed. We will consider four implications: (1) the design of scanning systems; (2) designs for loosening dependencies; (3) designs for

Designing Organizational Environments

If organizational actions are responses to their environments, then the external perspective on organizational functioning argues strongly that organizational behavior is determined through the design of organizational environments. The focus for attempts to change organizations, it would appear, should be the context of the organizations. By changing the context, the behavior of the organizations

The Design and Management of Externally Controlled Organizations: Organizational Futures

The literature is littered with predictions about what future organizations will look like and how they will operate and be managed. The fact that most of these predictions have not been realized is, we believe, a consequence of the inadequate theoretical base underlying them. We would like to conclude our exposition of the resource

Early Institutional Theory in Economics

1. European Quarrels It is good at the outset to acknowledge the lack of logical coherence in the strands of work to be examined. In many respects, the “old” institutional economics bears a stronger intellectual kinship with the “new” institutional approaches advanced by sociologists and organiza- tional scholars than to the “new” institutional economics.

Early Institutional Theory in Political Science

Institutional approaches dominated political science in both Europe and America during the latter half of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century. I concentrate on the American scene, but first call attention to the work of a well-known but neglected student of institutions and organizations: Alexis de Tocqueville. Living

Early Institutional Theory in Sociology

Attention to institutions by sociologists has been more constant than that exhibited by either economists or political scientists. While there are a number of different discernible strands with their distinctive vocabularies and emphases, we also observe continuity from the early work of Spencer and Sumner through Davis to the recent work of Friedland and

Institutions and Organizations: Early Approaches

1. The Columbia School: Merton’s and Selznick’s Institutional Models Shortly after selections from Weber’s seminal writings on bureau- cracy were translated into English during the late 1940s, a collection of scholars at Columbia University under the leadership of Robert K.Merton revived interest in bureaucracy and bureaucratization, its sources and consequences for behavior in organizations

Foundations of Neo-institutional Theory

We have arrived at the point in our history when the ideas that have come to be recognized as neoinstitutional theory appeared. As we will see, they do not represent a sharp break with the past, although there are new emphases and insights. In this section, I review the proximate sources and founding conceptions

Crafting an Analytic Framework: Three Pillars of Institutions

To an institutionalist, knowledge of what has gone before is vital information. The ideas and insights of our predecessors provide the context for current efforts and the platform on which we necessar- ily craft our own contributions. However, as should be clear even from my brief review, the concepts and arguments advanced by our

Crafting an Analytic Framework: Defining Institutions

Let us begin with the following omnibus conception of institutions: Institutions comprise regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive ele- ments that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. This is a dense definition containing a number of ideas that we will unpack, describe, and elaborate in this chapter and the

Crafting an Analytic Framework: The Three Pillars of Institutions

Regulative systems, normative systems, cultural-cognitive systems— each of these elements has been identified by one or another social theorist as the vital ingredient of institutions. The three elements form a continuum moving “from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted” (Hoffman 1997: 36). One possible approach would

Crafting an Analytic Framework: The Three Pillars and Legitimacy

“Organizations require more than material resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environ- ments. They also need social acceptability and credibility” (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000: 237)—in short, they require legitimacy. Suchman (1995b: 574) provides a helpful definition of this central con- cept: “Legitimacy is a

Basic Assumptions Associated With the Three Pillars

Although the differences among analysts emphasizing one or another element are partly a matter of substantive focus, they are also associ- ated with more profound differences in underlying philosophical assumptions. While it is not possible to do full justice to the complexity and subtlety of these issues, I attempt to depict the differences in